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Modeling the Dynamics of Network Technology
Adoption and the Role of Converters
Soumya Sen, Student Member, IEEE Youngmi Jin, Member, IEEE
Roch Guérin, Fellow, ACM; Fellow IEEE and Kartik Hosanagar
Abstract—New network technologies constantly seek to dis-
place incumbents. Their success depends on technological supe-
riority, the size of the incumbent’s installed base, users’ adoption
behaviors, and various other factors. The goal of this paper is
to develop an understanding of competition between network
technologies, and identify the extent to which different factors,
in particular converters (a.k.a. gateways), affect the outcome.
Converters can help entrants overcome the influence of the
incumbent’s installed base by enabling cross-technology inter-
operability. However, they have development, deployment, and
operations costs, and can introduce performance degradations
and functionality limitations, so that if, when, why, and how
they help is often unclear. To this end, the paper proposes and
solves a model for adoption of competing network technologies
by individual users. The model incorporates a simple utility
function that captures key aspects of users’ adoption decisions. Its
solution reveals a number of interesting and at times unexpected
behaviors, including the possibility for converters to reduce
overall market penetration of the technologies and to prevent
convergence to a stable state; something that never arises in their
absence. The findings were tested for robustness, e.g., different
utility functions and adoption models, and found to remain valid
across a broad range of scenarios.
Index Terms—Technology adoption, diffusion, externality, con-
verters, dynamics, equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology often see newer and better solu-
tions replacing older ones. Networking is no exception. For
example, the Internet competed against alternative packet data
technologies before finally displacing the phone network as the
de facto communication infrastructure. Recently, there have
been calls for new architectures to succeed it, and these will
face a formidable incumbent in the Internet. Their eventual
success in replacing it will likely depend not just on technical
superiority, but also on economic factors, and on their ability
to win over the Internet’s installed base.
A large installed base can give an incumbent an edge
even if a new (entrant) technology is technically superior.
The traditional networking approach to this problem has
been converters (a.k.a. gateways) to ease migration from one
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Workshop.
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technology to another. This is not unique to networks, but
converters are particularly important in network settings where
“communication” is the primary function, and its benefits grow
with the number of users that can be reached, e.g., as in Met-
calfe’s Law. Since converters allow users of one technology
to connect with users of another, they are an important tool in
the adoption of network technologies. However, developing,
deploying, and operating converters comes at a cost, one
that often grows as a function of the converter’s quality.
Further, converters can play a directionally ambiguous role.
On one hand, a converter can help the entrant overcome the
advantage of the incumbent’s large installed base by allowing
connectivity to it. On the other hand, the converter also helps
the incumbent technology by mitigating the impact of its users
migrating to the newer technology. Understanding the impact
of converters on network technology adoption is, therefore, a
topic that deserves further scrutiny.
In this paper, we develop a modeling framework to study
adoption dynamics of entrant and incumbent technologies
in the presence of network externalities. Specifically, we
introduce a model for the utility derived by an individual
user from a communication network, and use it to build an
aggregate model for technology adoption that is consistent
with individual rational decision-making. We apply the model
to study the role that converters can play in the adoption of
network technologies. Our main findings are:
• The adoption process can exhibit multiple steady state
outcomes (equilibria); each associated with a specific
region of initial adoption levels for the two technologies.
For example, an entrant technology may succeed only if
the incumbent is not already well entrenched.
• Converters can help a technology improve its own stand-
ing, i.e., market share, and even ensure its dominance
while it would have entirely disappeared in the absence
of converters. For example, a low-quality but low-cost
technology may thwart the success of a better but more
expensive competitor by preserving the ability of its users
to access adopters of the pricier technology, whose usage
would then be limited to a few “techno-buffs.”
• Improving converters’ efficiency can at times be harmful.
They can result in lower market shares for an individual
technology or for both. For instance, high market penetra-
tion may depend on the combination of a cheap but low-
end technology with a high-end but more expensive one
to adequately serve the full spectrum of user preferences.
A situation where converters allow the better technology
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to gain market share at the expense of the lesser tech-
nology may result in low-end users of that technology
dropping out altogether; thereby contributing to a lower
overall market penetration.
• While in the absence of converters technology adoption
always converges to a stable steady-state equilibrium, this
need not be so when converters are present. Boom-and-
bust cycles in which users switch back-and-forth between
technologies can arise when technologies are asymmetric
in the externality benefits they offer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces our model and problem formulation. Section III
characterizes technology adoption trajectories and equilibrium
adoption levels. Section IV explores the role of converters
in influencing adoption outcomes. Section V reviews prior
work and positions the paper in the literature. We discuss the
limitations of this study and conclude the paper with remarks
on future work in Section VI. The proofs of all propositions
can be found in [15].
II. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION MODEL
A. Technology Valuation
As in most competitive situations, the choice of one technol-
ogy over another depends on the “value” they provide. Value
is a somewhat elusive concept that depends in part on the
quality and functionality of the technology and its cost. In
the context of network technologies whose main purpose is
to enable communication among users, the number of users1
accessible through it is another important component, often
termed network effect or externality. As commonly done,
we account for these factors and their effect on technology
adoption through a utility function. For two competing network
technologies, 1 and 2, the respective utility functions are given
by eqs. (1) and (2).
U1 = θq1 + (x1 + α1βx2) − p1 (1)
U2 = θq2 + (βx2 + α2x1) − p2 (2)
Eqs. (1) and (2) consist of three distinct terms. Focusing on,
say, Technology 1, the first term, θq1 represents the stand-
alone benefits from the technology, with q1 representing the
intrinsic quality of the technology, and θ a random variable
accounting for heterogeneity in how users value technology.
The quantity q1 incorporates aspects of functionality, reliabil-
ity, performance, etc., for the technology. In the rest of the
paper, we assume q2 > q1, i.e., Technology 2 is superior
to Technology 1 and correspondingly can be viewed as the
entrant with Technology 1 playing the role of the incumbent.
The model, however, does not mandate such an assignment of
roles, e.g., it can be used to study settings where Technology
1 is the entrant and offers, say, a lower quality but cheaper
alternative than the incumbent Technology 2. The random
variable θ ∈ [0, 1] determines the relative weight a user
places on the intrinsic quality of a technology. It is private
information, but we assume that the distribution of θ across
1Users can be individuals or organizations, and include resources and
content.
users is known. We make the common assumption [2] that
θ is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. This choice
affects the magnitude of equilibrium adoption levels, but does
not qualitatively affect findings regarding technology adoption
dynamics and outcomes as demonstrated in [15, Appendix F].
The second component of the user’s utility is the network
externality (or network effect), which refers to benefits de-
rived from the ability to connect with other users. Network
externalities are chosen to be proportional to the number
of users to which each technology gives access. This linear
dependency of network benefits on the number of adopters
is consistent with Metcalfe’s Law and commonly used in the
literature [7]. In [15, Appendix F], we investigate other models
and demonstrate the robustness of our findings across different
functional forms for network externality, including non-linear
ones. Denoting as x1 and x2 the fractions of adopters of
each technology out of a large population of size N , the
externality benefits for Technology 1 consist of x1, the fraction
of Technology 1 users, plus α1βx2, a term that includes the
fraction of Technology 2 users weighed by two additional
factors. The first, 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, captures the availability
of converters offering connectivity from Technology 1 to
Technology 2 (α1 = 0 corresponds to no converter and
α1 = 1 to “perfect” converters). The second parameter, β,
allows different externality benefits for the two technologies2.
We note that converters, once deployed, are available to
all users of the technology. This corresponds to what we
term “technology-level” converters, i.e., their development and
deployment are decisions made by the providers of network
technologies.
Converters can be characterized as either duplex or simplex,
symmetric or asymmetric, and constrained or unconstrained.
Duplex converters provide bi-directional connectivity between
technologies, while simplex converters are present in only
one direction (most network technologies involve duplex con-
verters, but the model does not mandate them). Asymmetric
converters simply refer to the fact that converter efficiency
can be different in each direction i.e., α1 6= α2. The notion of
constrained vs. unconstrained converters arises in the presence
of technologies that exhibit different externalities, i.e., β 6= 1.
For example, when β > 1, it captures whether converters allow
users of Technology 1 access to the greater externality benefits
of Technology 2 when connecting to its users. A converter is
unconstrained if this is permitted, i.e., α1β > 1. We discuss
an example where this can arise at the end of the section.
The last element of eqs. (1) and (2) is the price, pi, i ∈
{1, 2}. Because of our focus on networks and connectivity that
is typically offered as a service rather than a good or product,
price is recurrent. In other words, maintaining connectivity
through a particular network technology incurs new charges
at regular intervals. As a result, users continuously reevaluate
their technology choices, and can switch from one technology
to another and possibly back. For analytical tractability, the
model assumes that switching costs are negligible. This repre-
sents a reasonable assumption in many settings. For example,
2Eqs. (1) and (2) implicitly express utility in units of Technology 1
externality benefits, i.e., Technology 1 externality benefits are equal to 1 when
its penetration level is 100% (x1 = 1).
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the very high customer churn (reported to range from 72%
all the way up to 98% per year [4], [13]) that prevails in
the ISP market points to little or no switching costs in that
market. On the other hand, non-zero switching costs, in the
form of contract breaking penalties and learning costs, are
the norm in many settings. A natural question is, therefore,
whether behaviors observed in the absence of switching costs
hold when they are present. Extending the analytical model to
incorporate switching costs is challenging, especially if one
is to consider the many possible types of switching costs,
but numerical investigations are feasible. Appendix G of [15]
reports on these investigations, which demonstrate a relative
insensitivity to switching costs. Obviously, as switching costs
increase, they eventually eliminate all adoption dynamics, but
the different behaviors that the (simple) model of the paper
helped reveal persist over a non-trivial range.
We note that the model parameters, i.e., qi, pi, αi, β, are
static and exogenously specified. An obvious extension is to
make them time-varying, e.g., technology gets better and/or
cheaper as time goes by, and the outcome of strategic decision-
making. Developing game-theoretic models that incorporate
such effects is clearly of interest, especially in the context
of competitive scenarios where firms may offer introductory
pricing or seed the market to gain an initial foothold. Exploring
those issues, however, requires that we first understand the
basic tenets of technology adoption and dynamics in the
simpler setting considered in this paper.
Another important question is how to assign actual values
to the model’s parameters. This is a topic that goes well
beyond this paper, and we only point to a possible approach.
A common method to estimate utility weights is conjoint anal-
ysis, a technique that has been widely adopted by marketing
researchers and practitioners (see [9] for a detailed review).
It relies on surveys offering users different combinations of
functionality and attributes to extract a relative ordering among
them, and ultimately produce individual weight assignments.
B. User Decisions
Given current adoption levels, x1 and x2, the utility func-
tions of eqs. (1) and (2) identify how a user values each
technology, which in turn determines her technology selection
decisions. Specifically, a user chooses Technology i whenever
it provides a surplus that is both positive (Individual Ratio-
nality constraint) and higher than that of the other technology
(Incentive Compatibility constraint). In other words, a user
chooses



no technology if Ui < 0 for all i,
Technology 1 if U1 > 0 and U1 > U2,
Technology 2 if U2 > 0 and U2 > U1.
Note that the model assumes an exclusive choice of tech-
nology by users, i.e., they select Technology 1, or 2, or
neither, but not both. This translates into the constraint 0 ≤
x1 +x2 ≤ 1. The dynamics of technology adoption arise from
the dependency of the Ui’s on the xi’s that change with users’
adoption decisions. Capturing these dynamics, therefore, calls
for specifying when users become aware of changes in the xi’s
and update their adoption decisions. Knowledge of changes in
adoption levels is likely to diffuse through the user population
and users’ reactions are often heterogeneous, i.e., some switch
quickly, while others defer. An approach, commonly used
in individual-level diffusion models [10] and that captures
these aspects is a continuous time approximation. Specifically,
assume that at time t the “current” technology adoption levels,
x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t)), are known to all users. With this in-
formation, users can compute their utility for each technology
and make adoption decisions. Let Hi(x(t)), i ∈ {1, 2} denote
the fraction of users for whom Technology i provides the
highest (and positive) utility3. The quantity Hi(x(t)) − xi(t)
corresponds to the fraction of users that would normally
proceed to adopt (disadopt) Technology i at time t. To capture
a progressive adoption process, we assume that the rate of
change in users’ technology choices is proportional to this
quantity, namely,
dxi(t)
dt
= γ
(
Hi(x(t)) − xi(t)
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
The quantity γ < 1 is analogous to the hazard rate in diffusion
models, and can be viewed as the expected conditional prob-
ability that an individual who has not yet adopted technology
i will do so at time t. In our analysis, we assume that the
propensity of individuals to adopt does not change with time,
i.e., γ is constant.
Two aspects of this diffusion process need further clarifi-
cation. First, users are myopic. At any instant, the adoption
decisions are driven by the number of adopters at that time
(xi(t)) and users are not able to anticipate likely adoption
levels in the future. This is analogous to a best response
dynamic. Second, the model identifies the rate of technology
adoption across users, but not which users are making the
change. To preserve consistency with user preferences, θ, we
assume that the first users to adopt Technology i are those
that stand to benefit most from the action. This ensures that at
all times the sets of users having adopted either technology
correspond to blocks of users with contiguous technology
preferences.
The diffusion dynamics governed by eq. (3) can converge
to a steady-state equilibrium x∗ characterized by:
dxi(t)
dt
∣
∣
∣
∣
x(t)=x∗
= 0 ⇔ x∗i = Hi(x
∗) for i ∈ {1, 2}. (4)
In other words, at equilibrium, the fraction of users for
whom it is individually rational and incentive compatible to
choose Technology i equals the current fraction of adopters
of Technology i. Based on this formulation, our goal is to
characterize, as a function of the exogenous system parameters
β, pi, qi, αi for i ∈ {1, 2}, the equilibrium adoption levels, i.e.,
the fixed points of eq. (4), and the dynamics leading to them.
Before exploring the dynamics and equilibria of technology
adoption that the model gives rise to, we pause to briefly
introduce a couple of examples that illustrate the model’s
parameters and applicability.
IPv4 vs. IPv6: The impending exhaustion of IPv4 addresses,
e.g., http:/www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4 for a daily countdown,
3We discuss the derivation of Hi(x(t)) in Section III-A.
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implies that service providers signing up new Internet cus-
tomers will have to start using IPv6 addresses or charge
more users who insist on an IPv4 address, i.e., pIPv4 = p1 >
p2 = pIPv6. As technologies, although IPv4 and IPv6 are
incompatible, they are largely similar so that for the purpose
of our model one can reasonably assume q1 . q2 and β = 1.
Because of their incompatibility, converters (gateways), e.g.,
see [5] for a representative recent proposal, are needed for IPv6
users to access the IPv4 content that is the bulk of today’s
Internet content and unlikely to become natively accessible
over IPv6 any time soon4. Conversely, those converters also
enable the reverse flow from IPv4 to IPv6, i.e., they are
duplex converters, albeit not necessarily delivering the same
performance in both directions, i.e., they can be asymmetric,
so that both α1 and α2 are non-zero but not always equal.
Users then decide between subscribing to an IPv4 or IPv6
service on the basis of price (pi), the level of content they are
able to access (xi), and the quality of that access (αi).
Low Def. vs. High Def. Video: The previous example illus-
trated a common adoption scenario with two mostly equivalent
technologies and duplex, asymmetric converters. Because of
the similarity of the two technologies (β = 1), converters
were by default constrained (α1β ≤ 1). However, when tech-
nologies exhibit significant differences in externality benefits,
e.g., β > 1, converters can be unconstrained (α1β > 1) and
we present next a possible example.
Consider a provider that offers its customers a video-
conferencing service with the associated equipment. The ser-
vice comes in two versions, high-definition (HD) and standard-
definition (SD), i.e., HD equipment generates a high-quality
(q2) video signal while SD equipment produces a lower reso-
lution (q1 < q2). Users derive value from video-conferencing
with one another, with β > 1 reflecting the higher quality
of an HD signal. The two services are priced accordingly
(p2 > p1). However, because video is a highly asymmetric
technology (encoding is hard but decoding is comparatively
easy), it is possible for the provider to enable the decoding of
HD signal on SD equipment (and obviously conversely). This
conversion can introduce quality degradations (α1 < 1), but
more importantly it allows SD users access to the external-
ity benefits associated with receiving HD signals. Assuming
HD↔SD conversion is available in both direction, this is an
instance of a duplex, possibly asymmetric (α1 6= α2), and
unconstrained (α1β > 1) converter.
Many users may then opt for the SD service because of its
lower price and the ability to still enjoy the higher benefits
of viewing HD signals. On the other hand, if all users were
to select the SD service, those externality benefits would
disappear. In general, users with high technology valuation (θ
close to 1) may still opt for the HD service, but the decision
depends on choices made by others.
III. TRAJECTORIES AND EQUILIBRIA
Solving the evolution of technology adoption decisions over
time described in eq. (3) calls for first computing expressions
4Although the servers hosting most web sites can typically get an
IPv6 address, very few have bothered registering one with DNS, e.g., see
http://bgp.he.net/ipv6-progress-report.cgi.
for Hi(x(t)), i = {1, 2} as functions of known parameters.
A. Characterizing Hi(x)
For notational convenience we omit dependency on time
and write x(t) simply as x. Recall that Hi(x), i ∈ {1, 2},
corresponds to the fraction of users for whom it is rational
to adopt Technology i, given the current adoption levels, x.
To determine the fraction of adopters of each technology, we
introduce the notion of indifference points, which identify
thresholds in users technology valuation (θ) corresponding
to changes in technology preference. Specifically, θ0i (x), i ∈
{1, 2} identify the θ value separating users with a negative
utility for Technology i from those with a positive utility. In
other words, for technology penetration levels x, θ0i (x) is such
that Ui(θ
0
i , x) = 0, and Ui(θ, x) is positive (negative) for θ
values larger (smaller) than θ0i .
From eqs. (1) and (2), Ui(θ
0
i , x) = 0 gives
θ01(x) =
p1 − (x1 + α1βx2)
q1
(5)
θ02(x) =
p2 − (βx2 + α2x1)
q2
(6)
Similarly, θ12(x) corresponds to the θ value separating users
preferring Technology 1 from those preferring Technology 2,
i.e., U1(θ
1
2 , x) = U2(θ
1
2 , x) and users with θ > θ
1
2(x) derive
greater utility from Technology 2 than Technology 1 (recall
that q2 > q1). Setting, U1(θ
1
2 , x) = U2(θ
1
2 , x) gives
θ12(x) =
(1 − α2)x1 − β(1 − α1)x2 + p2 − p1
q2 − q1
(7)
Combining eqs. (5)-(7) gives
θ12(x) − θ
0
1(x) =
q2
q2 − q1
(θ02(x) − θ
0
1(x)), (8)
θ12(x) − θ
0
2(x) =
q1
q2 − q1
(θ02(x) − θ
0
1(x)), (9)
from which the following Proposition can be derived.
Proposition 1:
If θ01(x) < θ
0
2(x), then θ
1
2(x) > θ
0
2(x) > θ
0
1(x).
If θ01(x) ≥ θ
0
2(x), then θ
1
2(x) ≤ θ
0
2(x) ≤ θ
0
1(x).
Proposition 1 constrains the possible orderings of the indif-
ference points given by eqs. (5)-(7), so that Hi(x), i ∈ {1, 2}
can be characterized in a compact manner.
H1(x) =

[θ12(x)][0,1] − [θ01(x)][0,1] if θ01(x) < θ02(x)
0 otherwise
(10)
H2(x) =

1 − [θ12(x)][0,1] if θ01(x) < θ02(x)
1 − [θ02(x)][0,1] otherwise
where y[a,b] is the ‘projection
5’ of y into [a, b].
The expressions for H1(x) and H2(x) determine the trajec-
tory as well as the equilibrium outcome of the adoption process
as per eqs. (3) and (4) respectively. Eq. (10) characterizes
Hi(x), i = {1, 2} through multiple possible expressions that
depend on the relative ordering of θ01(x), θ
0
2(x) and θ
1
2(x),
5i.e., its value is y for y ∈ [a, b], a for y < a, and b for y > b.
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and the outcome of their projections on [0, 1]. Identifying the
different combinations that eq. (10) gives rise to calls for par-
titioning the (x1, x2)-plane into regions, each corresponding
to unique expressions for the (H1(x), H2(x)) pair. A method
for constructing such a partition is described next.
First, consider all values of x which satisfy θ01(x) ≥ θ
0
2(x).
In the corresponding half-plane of the (x1, x2)-plane, H1(x) is
always 0, but the value of H2(x) depends on the projection of
θ02(x) on [0, 1] (i.e., whether θ
0
2(x) ≤ 0, 0 < θ
0
2(x) < 1, or 1 ≤
θ02(x)). This creates three regions in the (x1, x2)-plane, each
with a different expression for the (H1(x), H2(x)) pair. These
three regions, labeled R1, R2 and R3, and the corresponding
conditions on θ02(x) appear in the left side of Table I. The
expressions for Hi(x), i = {1, 2} in each region are provided
in Table II.
Conversely, for values of x which satisfy θ01(x) < θ
0
2(x) (the
other half-plane), eq. (10) indicates that expressions for H1(x)
and H2(x) depend on the positions of both θ
1
2(x) and θ
0
1(x)
relative to 0 and 1 (i.e., whether θ12(x) ≤ 0, 0 < θ
1
2(x) < 1
or 1 ≤ θ12(x), and similarly for θ
0
1(x)). This yields nine
possible combinations. The number of feasible combinations
can, however, be reduced to six using Proposition 1, which
constrains θ01(x) < θ
0
2(x) < θ
1
2(x). For example, when
θ01(x) < θ
0
2(x), θ
1
2(x) ≤ 0 and 1 ≤ θ
0
1(x) is infeasible per
Proposition 1. Thus in the half-plane θ01(x) < θ
0
2(x), there
are six possible expressions for Hi(x), i = {1, 2}. These
expressions are reported on the right side of Table I, with the
corresponding regions labeled R4 to R9. Combining the two
half-planes gives a total of nine regions, R1 to R9, where in
each region the (H1(x), H2(x)) pair has a unique expression
as specified in Table II.
This partitioning in nine regions has a graphical representa-
tion, as shown in Figure 1. The line θ01(x) = θ
0
2(x) splits the
(x1, x2)-plane in the two previously mentioned half-planes.
The two lines corresponding to θ02(x) = 0 and θ
0
2(x) = 1
are parallel, and define the three regions R1, R2 and R3 in
the half-plane θ01(x) ≥ θ
0
2(x). Similarly, the lines θ
0
1(x) = 0,
θ01(x) = 1, θ
1
2(x) = 0 and θ
1
2 = 1, divide the second half-plane
into the six regions, R4 to R9. Figure 1 also illustrates that
the lines θ02(x) = 0, θ
0
1(x) = 0 and θ
1
2(x) = 0 always intersect
at a point denoted as P , and the lines θ02(x) = 1, θ
0
1(x) = 1
and θ12(x) = 1 always intersect at a point denoted as Q, with
both P and Q6 lying on the line θ01 = θ
0
2 . The points P and Q
can be shown to act as “anchors” that ensure that the (x1, x2)-
plane is always partitioned into exactly nine regions with fixed
relative positions.
It should also be noted that all nine regions need not always
be feasible. Whether or not they are feasible depends on their
relative position in the solution space, S = {(x1, x2) s.t. 0 ≤
x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1, x1 + x2 ≤ 1}. The number of regions
that lie inside S (and hence are relevant to the analysis) is
a function of the system parameters (qi, pi, β, αi; i = {1, 2}).
Last but not least, as shown in [15, Appendix B], the parti-
tioning of the solution space into nine regions actually holds
for more generic (monotonic) externality functions, i.e., it is
6The coordinates of the points P and Q can be readily found by solving
simple systems of linear equations given by eqs.(5)-(7).
not an artifact of the simplified linear externality function.
Finally, we pause to briefly interpret the conditions that
define each region, and their implications for solutions. We
do so by way of an example, focusing on Region R8. Region
R8 is defined as the set of adoption levels, x = (x1, x2), for
which 1 ≤ θ12(x) and 0 ≤ θ
0
1(x) < 1. The condition 1 ≤ θ
1
2(x)
implies that in Region 8 all users prefer Technology 1 over 2.
Hence any existing Technology 2 adopter will disadopt. Thus,
in R8, users can either be non-adopters of both technologies
(0 < θ < θ01(x)) or adopters of Technology 1 (if θ > θ
0
1(x)).
Similar interpretations are possible for other regions.
Fig. 1. Region Partitions
B. Characterizing Adoption Trajectories
By combining eqs. (5) to (7) with eq. (10), explicit expres-
sions can be obtained for Hi(x) in each of the nine regions.
These are listed in Table II. Using these expressions, it is
now possible to solve eq. (3) and characterize the trajectory
of technology adoption in each region. The trajectories have
the following general form:
xi(t) = ai + bie
λ1t + cie
λ2t, i ∈ {1, 2} (11)
where λ1 and λ2 can be positive, negative, or complex
depending on the region. Individual solutions for each region
are listed in Table III of the Appendix.
The full trajectory of technology adoption starting at some
initial adoption levels x(0) within a given region, can then
be obtained by “stitching” together trajectories in individual
regions as region boundaries are crossed. The next question
is to determine whether and where these trajectories may
eventually converge as t → ∞. We tackle this issue next.
C. Computing Steady-state Equilibria
From eq. (11), we see that a technology adoption trajectory
in, say, region Rk, converges to a stable equilibrium xi(∞) =
ai, i ∈ {1, 2}, if λ1 and λ2 are both negative (equilibrium
is locally stable), and (a1, a2) ∈ S ∩ Rk (the equilibrium
is valid, i.e., in the region associated with the trajectory). In
other words, solutions to eq. (4) (Hi(x
∗) = x∗i , i ∈ {1, 2}),
must satisfy stability and validity conditions to be valid steady-
state outcomes of the technology adoption process7. The
7Our model is well-behaved and instances of boundary fixed points do not
arise
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TABLE I
PARTITIONS CHARACTERIZING Hi(x)
θ01(x) ≥ θ02(x) θ01(x) < θ02(x)
Region condition Region condition
R1 θ
0
2(x) ≤ 0 R4 θ12(x) ≤ 0, 0 ≤ θ01(x)
R2 0 < θ
0
2(x) < 1 R5 0 < θ
1
2(x) < 1, θ
0
1(x) ≤ 0
R3 1 ≤ θ02(x) R6 0 < θ12(x) < 1, 0 < θ01(x) < 1
R7 1 ≤ θ12(x), θ01(x) ≤ 0
R8 1 ≤ θ12(x), 0 < θ01(x) < 1
R9 1 ≤ θ12(x), 1 ≤ θ01(x)
TABLE II
EXPRESSIONS FOR Hi(x)
R1
H1(x) = 0
H2(x) = 1
R2 H2(x) = 1 − p2−(βx2+α2x1)q2
R3 H2(x) = 0
R4 H1(x) = 0 H2(x) = 1
R5 H1(x) =
(1−α2)x1−β(1−α1)x2+p2−p1
q2−q1
H2(x) = 1 − (1−α2)x1−β(1−α1)x2+p2−p1q2−q1
R6 H1(x) =
(1−α2)x1−β(1−α1)x2+p2−p1
q2−q1
H2(x) = 1 − (1−α2)x1−β(1−α1)x2+p2−p1q2−q1
− p1−(x1+βα1x2)
q1
R7 H1(x) = 1
H2(x) = 0R8 H1(x) = 1 − p1−(x1+βα1x2)q1
R9 H1(x) = 0
simple nature of eq. (4) makes characterizing valid and stable
solutions relatively straightforward, albeit tedious. The results
are listed in Tables IV and V in the Appendix. Table IV of
the Appendix gives the stability conditions associated with
each equilibrium, along with the joint validity and stability
conditions (they are inter-dependent) in the last column.
The derivations are mechanical in nature, but we review the
implications and properties of their solutions.
First, possible equilibria include instances where one tech-
nology wipes out the other while achieving either full (x∗i = 1)
or partial (0 ≤ x∗i < 1) market penetration, and instances
where both technologies coexist, again at either full (x∗1+x
∗
2 =
1) or partial market penetration (0 ≤ x∗1 + x
∗
2 < 1). Instances
where both technologies die-out, i.e., x∗ = (0, 0), while
possible (the equilibrium lies in regions R3 or R9), are absent
from Table IV (see Appendix), as we restrict our focus to
scenarios where Technology 1 survives in the absence of the
Technology 2’s introduction. This precludes a (0, 0) outcome.
Second, although not explicitly indicated in Table IV (see
Appendix), configurations can be found for which the validity
and stability conditions of multiple equilibria are simulta-
neously satisfied. In other words, depending on the initial
conditions x(0), technology adoption converges to different
outcomes. The following proposition identifies the configura-
tions of multiple equilibria that can simultaneously arise for a
given set of parameter values.
Proposition 2: The only combination of multiple valid and
stable equilibria that can coexist are:
1. (1, 0) and (0, 1)
2. (x∗1R8 , 0) and (0, 1)
3. (x∗1R8 , 0) and (0, x
∗
2R2
)
4. (1, 0) and (0, x∗2R2 )
5. (x∗1R5 , 1 − x
∗
1R5
) and (0, x∗2R2 )
6. (x∗1R6 , x
∗
2R6
) and (0, 1)
7. (x∗1R6 , x
∗
2R6
) and (1, 0)
Additionally, no combination of three or more equilibria can
coexist as valid and stable equilibria.
The proof of the above proposition is available in [15,
Appendix D]. When multiple equilibria arise, the initial market
penetration determines the equilibrium to which the adoption
process converges. Therefore it is useful to identify the set of
all initial market levels, x(0), for which the adoption trajectory
converges to a particular stable equilibrium. This set is known
as the ‘Basin of Attraction’ of that stable equilibrium. If the
stable equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium in the system
i.e., globally stable, then the entire region S is its basin of
attraction. That is, all starting points lead to the equilibrium.
But whenever a pair of stable equilibria coexist, a ‘separatrix’,
demarcating the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria
can be computed. The expressions for the separatrices are
provided in [15, Table VI, Appendix E].
Figure 2 provides an illustrative example. The figure, called
a phase diagram, shows the path of the diffusion process in
the (t, x1, x2) space projected onto the (x1, x2) plane. In other
words, it plots x1(t) versus x2(t) and is what one would see
if one stood high on the time axis and looked down into the
(x1, x2) plane, sometimes referred to as the phase plane. We
observe that there are two stable steady-state equilibria (of the
form (0, x∗2) and (x
∗
1, 0)) and an unstable equilibrium in R6. A
separatrix passes through this unstable equilibrium, separating
the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria.
The framework developed here can be used in a wide range
of situations to model the dynamics of adoption. As an illustra-
tion of the useful insights that such a model can offer, we apply
our model to studying the role of converters in the adoption
of incompatible technologies. We see from Tables IV and V
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Fig. 2. Separatix and the Basins of Attraction
(p1 = 1.2, q1 = 2.95, p2 = 2.54, q2 = 5.1, α2 = α1 = 0.01, β = 1)
of the Appendix that converters can influence (through the
parameters αi) both the validity and the stability of equilibria.
In other words, converters may lead technology adoption to an
entirely different equilibrium. A rapid inspection of Table III
(see Appendix) shows that a similar conclusion holds for
trajectories. In particular, converters can affect the values of
λ1 and λ2 of eq. (11). Investigating if and when such changes
can happen, is the topic of Section IV.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CONVERTERS
As we shall see, converters are capable not just of shifting
equilibria around; they can also eliminate or create equilibria.
An exhaustive investigation of the full influence of converters,
while possible, results in a situation where it is difficult to
“see the forest for the trees.” As a result, we focus on what we
believe are some of the more revealing and significant effects
of converters. We identify the reasons behind these effects,
and provide conditions under which they can arise.
The investigation proceeds along the following thrusts:
(i) Can converters help a network technology improve its
market standing and in particular avoid elimination? (ii) Can
improving the efficiency of one’s converter hurt a technology?
(iii) Can improving the efficiency of one’s converter hurt the
overall market? and (iv) Can the introduction of converters
affect overall market stability? Note that when referring to
converters of a particular technology, we mean converters
developed by that technology provider to let its users commu-
nicate with users of the other technology. This distinction is
moot when using symmetric converters, but worth highlighting
as the model allows it.
A. Impact on Adoption Levels
We begin our investigation with a simple numerical example
that illustrates how converters can induce drastic changes in
the adoption of network technologies. Specifically, consider
the scenario of Figure 3 that shows two adoption outcomes for
the same two network technologies (p1 = 1.01, q1 = 0.7, p2 =
2.5, q2 = 2.51, β = 3), with and without converters.
The plot on the left corresponds to a scenario without
converters (α1 = α2 = 0) and in which Technology 2
eventually eliminates Technology 1 and achieves full market
penetration8. This corresponds to a single, stable equilibrium
(0, 1). The right hand plot shows how the use of perfect
converters results in the elimination of the original (0, 1)
equilibrium, so that the only possible outcome of technology
adoption is now one where both technologies co-exist.
Figure 3 answers our question regarding a technology’s abil-
ity to avoid elimination through the introduction of converters,
and thus leading to a new equilibrium adoption outcome. We
now state it more formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Converters can help a technology alter mar-
ket equilibrium from a scenario where it has been eliminated
to one where it coexists with the other technology, or even
succeeds in nearly eliminating it.
The proofs of Proposition 3 and subsequent propositions
can all be found in [15, Appendix D].
As discussed above, Figure 3 provides a sample configu-
ration illustrating Proposition 3, i.e., Technology 1 goes from
elimination to dominating Technology 2 simply by introducing
an efficient converter. Table IV (see Appendix) identifies that
the equilibrium (0, 1) becomes invalid when the converter
efficiency of Technology 1 verifies α1 > 1 −
p2−p1
β
. Note
that since 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, this requires p1 < p2. Assuming this is
the case, the difference between the maximum intra-network
benefits of Technology 2 and the maximum cross-networks
(through the converter) benefits that the users of Technology
1 derive, becomes equal to the price differential between
the two technologies. As a result, low-end users (with small
θ values) become indifferent to choosing either technology
i.e., θ12 = 0, and any further increase in α1 leads them to
switching to Technology 1. Depending on the values of the
other system parameters, it is possible that further increases
in α1 can allow it to nearly eliminate Technology 2. Note
that while Technology 1 may succeed in nearly eliminating
Technology 2, a small number of users of Technology 2 must
remain present to contribute externality benefits to the users
of Technology 1. Note also that Figure 3 considers symmetric
converters and thus the outcome is not one that can be changed
by the other technology deploying its own converters. This is
a general phenomenon, and most if not all of the results in this
section also hold under the constraint of symmetric converters
(we will explicitly highlight those that don’t).
A similar set of results hold for Technology 2 that, under
some conditions, can enjoy the same benefits from convert-
ers. The symmetric condition that allows Technology 2 to
overcome elimination ((1, 0) is now the initial equilibrium),
is to introduce a converter whose efficiency α2 exceeds
α2 ≥ 1 + (p2 − p1) − (q2 − q1). In other words, Technology
2 needs to develop a converter whose efficiency compensates
for both the maximum intra-network benefits of Technology 1
and the difference between the price and quality differentials of
the two technologies9. At that point, θ12 = 1 so that with any
further improvement in its converter efficiency, Technology
8Note that this is a scenario in which Technology 1 is marginally compet-
itive, i.e., if left alone it would achieve a relatively low market penetration.
9The price differential must be lower than the quality differential, i.e., p2−
p1 < q2 − q1, for this to be possible.
8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x
1
: Fraction of Technology 1 users
x 2
: 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
T
e
ch
n
o
lo
g
y 
2
 u
se
rs
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x
1
: Fraction of Technology 1 users
x 2
: 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
T
e
ch
n
o
lo
g
y 
2
 u
se
rs
α
1
=α
2
=0 α
1
=α
2
=1
Fig. 3. On the effect of converters on the existence of equilibria.(p1 = 1.01, q1 = 0.7, p2 = 2.5, q2 = 2.51, β = 3)
2 will start attracting some high-end users (large θ values)
and eventually re-emerge. As with Technology 1, further
improvements in its converter efficiency can in some cases
allow Technology 2 to nearly wipe out Technology 1, although
again not entirely.
Similar results can also be obtained from Table IV for
(x∗1, 0) and (0, x
∗
2), i.e., instances when the elimination of a
technology does not coincide with full market penetration for
the other.
The behavior highlighted by Proposition 3 is relatively
common. Consider our earlier example of IPv4 and IPv6.
The large IPv4 installed base (or conversely, the small amount
of content natively accessible over IPv6) mandates converters
(gateways) that allow IPv6-only users10 to access IPv4 content.
Without such converters, IPv6 is unlikely to ever take-off.
Conversely, once such converters are in place, it is possible
for IPv6 to eventually fully replace IPv4.
Proposition 3 focused on a scenario where converters help
a technology avoid elimination. Next, we explore whether it
is possible for an increase in converter efficiency to actually
harm a technology, i.e., lower its market penetration.
Proposition 4: Technology 1 can hurt its market penetration
by introducing a converter and/or improving its efficiency if
Technology 2 offers higher externality benefits (β > 1) and the
users of Technology 1 are able to access these benefits (α1β >
1). Furthermore, whenever Technology 1 hurts its own market
penetration, it also reduces the overall market penetration. In
contrast, Technology 2 can never hurt itself while improving
its own converter efficiency.
Note that the proposition implicitly assumes asymmetric
converters, i.e., explores the effect of unidirectional converter
introduction or improvement.
The following discussion tries to shed light on when and
why the outcome of Proposition 4 arises. Intuitively, the orig-
inal impetus for Technology 1 to improve the efficiency of its
converters, is to make itself more attractive to potential users
by allowing them to better tap into the (higher) externality
benefits of Technology 2. It may then attract new users,
either from among those that had not previously adopted any
10Those that have only an IPv6 address once IPv4 addresses have been
exhausted.
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Fig. 4. Better converters harm Technology 1 and the overall market when
α1 is increased from 0.85 to 1.
(p1 = 1.3, q1 = 0.8, p2 = 2.3, q2 = 2.4, α2 = 0.6, β = 2.5)
technology or among users of Technology 2 who decide to
switch to Technology 1. It is the acquisition of the latter type
of users that can prove harmful to Technology 1. Specifically,
because α1β > 1, the switching of users from Technology
2 to Technology 1 negatively affects the externality benefits
of all Technology 1 users. When β is high, the decrease in
externality benefit can be significant. As illustrated in Figure 5,
the result of this decrease can be that some low-end (small θ)
users decide to leave Technology 1 and exit the market. When
the influx of new users is less than the outflow, the overall
penetration of Technology 1 decreases. Figure 4 shows an
instance of such a decrease. Additionally, the same reasoning
shows that this also results in a decrease in overall market
penetration (both x1 and x2 decrease).
This behavior can arise in the earlier example of competing
HD and SD video services, as it satisfies the requirement
that α1β > 1. Specifically, although SD users are limited
to generating SD quality videos, through converters they can
receive and enjoy the higher-quality of HD videos. As a result,
they will be negatively affected by any move of HD users back
to SD. This can in turn lead some SD users to disadopt the
service altogether. Hence, lowering their own user base and
the overall market penetration of both services.
When β ≥ 1, it is easy to see that the argument used for
Technology 1 does not hold for Technology 2, i.e., acquiring a
customer from Technology 1 will never decrease the external-
9
Fig. 5. Technology 1 hurts itself as well as the overall market penetration.
ity benefits of Technology 2 users, so that it cannot experience
such a reversal when improving its own converter. A proof that
this property actually holds for all values of β, i.e., even when
β ≤ 1 is provided in [15, Appendix D].
Proposition 4 indicated that Technology 1 could not only
hurt itself through better converters, but also the overall market
penetration. The next proposition investigates the negative im-
pact of converters on overall market penetration, and formally
identifies conditions under which this takes place.
Proposition 5: Both technologies can hurt overall market
penetration through better converters. Technology 2 can have
such an effect only when α1β < 1, i.e., Technology 1
users derive lower externality benefits from connecting to
Technology 2 users than to their peers. Conversely, Technology
1 demonstrates this behavior only when α1β > 1, i.e., its
users derive greater externality benefits from connecting to
Technology 2 users than to their peers.
As the discussion of Proposition 4 already highlighted how
this could occur with Technology 1, we focus instead on
Technology 2. The motivation for better converters remains the
same, namely, allow users of Technology 2 to derive higher
externality benefits by connecting to users of Technology 1.
This improvement in the externality benefits of Technology 2
leads some users (those close to the θ12 boundary) to switch.
When α1β < 1, the migration of those users from Technology
1 to Technology 2 translates into a net drop in the overall
utility Technology 1 offers its remaining users (the externality
benefits contributed by every user that migrates goes down
from a relative weight of 1 to one of α1β < 1). This decrease
in Technology 1 value then leads some low valuation users
(small θ) to drop out altogether. Technology 1 fails to provide
them with enough externality benefits to justify even its low
cost, while Technology 2 remains too expensive for them. This
brings the overall market penetration down.
It is interesting to note that the use of converters by
Technology 2 can effectively force low valuation users to
leave the market. This may not be desirable and suggests the
possibility of policy interventions- regulations and/or market
mechanisms- to offer low valuation users alternatives that al-
low them to stay in the market. This can include increasing the
attractiveness of Technology 1 (e.g., subsidizing improvements
in its converter efficiency), or by asking Technology 2 to
provide a low-tier, low-cost version of its service that caters
to low valuation users.
For a real world instance where the conditions of Propo-
sition 5 could be satisfied, consider again the IPv4 vs. IPv6
scenario for which β ≈ 1, and assume that IPv6 has taken off
but that providers serving low valuation customers have not
bothered with converting them to IPv6. If the converters that
allow these legacy IPv4 users to access the now increasingly
IPv6-only content are of low quality, it is possible that some of
them will, if not drop their IPv4 service, at least significantly
reduce their usage.
Figure 6 provides an example. In this configuration, in the
absence of converters, Technology 1 had reached full market
penetration. When Technology 2 introduces a converter of
efficiency α2 = 0.45, it emerges and both technologies coexist
at equilibrium, while still achieving full market penetration. If
the efficiency of Technology 2 converter further improves, it
still sees a rise in its own market penetration, but the overall
market penetration now decreases to ≈ 55%, as low valuation
users drop out.
B. Impact on Adoption Dynamics
The previous sub-section explored the effect that converters
can have on equilibria. In this sub-section we extend the
investigation to both trajectories and equilibria. In particular,
we concentrate on an unexpected effect of converters, one that
can be shown not to be possible in their absence, namely,
the possibility that the introduction of converters can render
the process of technology adoption unstable. In the next
proposition, we specify the conditions under which it can arise.
Proposition 6: The introduction of converters can create
“boom and bust” cycles in the technology adoption process.
This behavior arises only when Technology 2 exhibits higher
externality benefits (β > 1) than Technology 1 and the users
of Technology 1 are unconstrained in their ability to access
these benefits (α1β > 1).
Conversely, the next corollary establishes that this never occurs
in the absence of converters. The proofs are again in [15,
Appendix D].
Corollary 4.1: In the absence of converters, technology
adoption trajectories always converge to a stable equilibrium.
Before trying to offer some insight into the emergence of in-
stabilities when converters are introduced, we offer an example
to illustrate the type of outcomes that can arise.
Figure 7 provides a sample scenario of converters affecting
the stability of technology adoption, and in particular introduc-
ing cycles in the adoption trajectories. The left-hand-side of the
figure shows how in the absence of converters, Technology 2
displaces Technology 1 and achieves full market penetration.
The introduction of a reasonably efficient converter (α1 ≈
0.623) by Technology 1, however, drastically changes the situ-
ation by introducing two new equilibria; both of them unstable
(middle diagram). As a result, while the original equilibrium
of (0, 1) remains valid, its basin of attraction has now shrunk
considerably . Instead, under most initial conditions, a cyclical
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Fig. 6. Greedy Technology 2 harms overall market penetration. (p1 = 0.9, q1 = 1.9, p2 = 2.7, q2 = 4.3, α1 = 0, β = 1.2)
pattern of adoption decisions emerges. In other words, users
repeatedly switch back and forth between the two network
technologies. Matters only become worse if the efficiency of
the converter of Technology 1 continues improving11, and with
a perfect converter the original equilibrium of (0, 1) has all
but disappeared and only one, unstable equilibrium remains
around which adoption decisions keep circling.
The intuition behind the emergence of such a situation is
somewhat similar to that of a technology harming itself and/or
the overall market through the introduction of better convert-
ers. Specifically, consider an instance where Technology 2
offers higher externality benefits that users of Technology 1
can tap into if a converter is available. When converters are
absent, users that value the higher quality of Technology 2
adopt it (when it offers a higher overall utility), eventually
leading to full adoption as shown on the left most part of
Figure 7. However, once a converter is introduced, users have
the option to remain with Technology 1 (and enjoy its lower
price) without forfeiting all the benefits of Technology 2,
and in particular its externality benefits. As a result, while
Technology 2 will initially still gain market share by attracting
high technology valuation users away from Technology 1, this
now happens with Technology 1 also gaining new customers
(low technology valuation customers are now adopting because
of the externality benefits accessible through the new users
who joined Technology 2). This combined effects results in a
steady increase in overall market share until a limit is reached.
This limit corresponds to a point where Technology 2 has
tapped out all the high technology valuation users it could
attract. As Technology 2 growth tapers off, Technology 1 con-
tinues growing as it still attracts new low technology valuation
customers. Continued growth in Technology 1 customer base
eventually makes it attractive to some mid-range technology
valuation customers that start switching back to it. This fuels
an accelerated growth in the user base of Technology 1 that
now acquires customers from both Technology 2 and non-
adopters. This continues until the user base of Technology
2 becomes so small that it starts affecting the ability of
Technology 1 to grow. At this point, both technologies start
loosing customers. This ends when the customer base of
Technology 1 is small enough to allow Technology 2 to again
11As mentioned before, similar situations arise under symmetric converters.
start attracting customers (its own customer base had by then
all but disappeared), and the process repeats anew.
To illustrate this behavior in a less abstract setting, we return
to the example of HD and SD video conference services of
Section II. The higher quality HD service when introduced
attracts high-valuation users, who switch over from the ex-
isting SD service. This eventually results in a new market
equilibrium. If the SD service responds to this competition
by introducing its own converter, it will entice some (low-
valuation) non-adopters to adopt, as they now have access to
the higher benefits of viewing other users in HD quality. As the
number of SD users grows, the technology attracts back some
of the lesser valuation HD adopters, because of its lower cost
and increased externality benefits (from its larger user base
and access to HD users). This results in an increase in SD
adoption level and a corresponding drop in HD’s. However,
as the switching from HD to SD continues, the drop in the
number of HD users lowers the overall externality benefits
available to SD users. Consequently, the lowest valuation SD
users begin to disadopt. This decrease in the number of SD
users, and therefore the externality benefits that the SD service
affords, makes the higher valuation SD users switch back to
the HD service. This creates a situation where SD adoption
drops, while the HD service grows. As before, the growth
of the HD service eventually draws low-valuation users (non-
adopters) to the lower-priced SD service. The two services
then grow until SD’s user population has once again grown
large enough to attract the lesser valuation HD users. At which
point the cycle repeats anew.
V. RELATED WORK
Modeling the diffusion of new products and technologies
has a long tradition in marketing. Fourt and Woodlock [8] first
proposed a product diffusion model in which a fixed fraction
of consumers who have not yet bought the product do so at
every period; this is known as the constant hazard rate model.
Bass [1] proposed an extension that additionally incorporates
word-of-mouth communication between current adopters and
potential adopters. A large body of work has since built
on these earlier models (see [12] for an overview of this
literature). Although most of the literature deals with single-
product settings, Norton and Bass [14] study the joint diffusion
of successive generations of technologies. Their model belongs
11
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Fig. 7. Effect of converters on adoption stability (p1 = 1.05, q1 = 0.4, p2 = 2.1, q2 = 2.11, α2 = 0.3, α1 = 0.675, β = 2.8)
to a class of substitution models that assume that the newer
generation eventually replaces the earlier generation and thus
their interest is only in the time it takes for this to occur.
Significantly, both single-product and multiple-generation dif-
fusion models focus on aggregate adoption dynamics without
explicitly modeling individual decision-making processes. The
advantage of such an approach is that it results in relatively
simple diffusion models that can, in turn, be used to study
dynamic policies (e.g., dynamic pricing). Unfortunately, these
aggregate models do not shed sufficient light on the decision
processes that lead to the emergent system dynamics or the
exact mechanism through which various decision variables
(pricing, quality, advertising, etc.) impact adoption decisions.
A few models have focused on individual-level adoption
(e.g., [10]). These models provide far greater insight into the
mechanism through which rational individual decision-making
results in aggregate system dynamics. Given the complexity
of these models, much of the progress to date has been in
settings with a single technology. In contrast, the adoption of
new network technologies is often influenced by incumbents.
Moreover, all of the above models and indeed much of the
literature refers to generic durables, e.g., washing machines.
Such models do not account for the unique features of network
technologies, including network externalities and the role of
converters.
A recent stream of work in economics has studied the role
of network externalities on equilibrium adoption of standards
and technologies. Cabral [2] develops a model of individual
decision-making in the presence of network externalities and
characterizes the aggregate adoption dynamics. He shows that
network externalities are potential drivers of S-shaped diffu-
sion curves. We build on Cabral’s model but differ in our focus
by considering a two-technology setting. Put another way, we
are interested in the diffusion of a new network technology
in the presence of an incumbent. A related paper by Farrell
and Saloner [6] evaluates the impact of an installed base on
the transition to a new standard. They show that the installed
base can cause “excess inertia” which prevents the transition
to the new standard. At the same time, the adoption of the
new standard by a few users can create “excess momentum”
as well. In their model, users are homogeneous except for the
time of their arrival into the system. As a result, they observe a
bandwagon effect in which the adoption of a standard by one
set of users makes the same choice more attractive to all other
users. Thus, one standard always wins and coexistence is not
feasible. Choi [3] extends the model by Farrell and Saloner [6]
to include converters and shows that converters can in some
instances blockade the transition by weakening the threat of
being stranded for users of the incumbent technology. In a
more recent study, Joseph et al. [11] also show that increase
in efficiency of a converter can hinder the adoption of a new
network architecture.
An important distinction of our work relative to these papers
is that we incorporate heterogeneity in user preferences. We
show that this gives rise to equilibria in which the technologies
may coexist, i.e., neither network technology fully captures the
market. Further, very little attention is paid to the adoption path
in these papers because all users make the same decision. In
contrast, we show that the heterogeneity across users can result
in interesting adoption dynamics including non-monotonic
evolution of the market shares of the technologies. Addi-
tionally, these papers focus on environments in which users
make the decisions to adopt the converters. This is meaningful
in environments in which the converter functionality and its
deployment resides with individual users, e.g., converters for
two incompatible software applications that a user decides to
download. In contrast, our interest is in environments in which
converters are usually deployed by the technology providers
upon incurring high fixed costs, and in the process made
available to all its users.
VI. CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS
The paper provides a framework to study the adoption
and diffusion of a new network technology in the presence
of an incumbent and offers insight into the role of con-
verters. Our model accounts for both externalities and user
heterogeneity, and helps reveal several unexpected behaviors.
Of note are that the presence of converters can hurt overall
market penetration, and that under certain conditions they can
preclude the adoption process from ever converging. In [15,
Appendix F and G], we show that these behaviors remain
present across a wide range of utility models that differ from
the one used for analytical tractability in this paper. These
robustness tests consider nonlinear externality functions, non-
uniform distribution of user preferences, user heterogeneity in
both standalone and network benefits and switching costs.
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As the first step of our investigation in the dynamics of tech-
nology adoption in the presence of converters, the paper and
its model clearly have limitations that we plan to address in
the future. As mentioned earlier, allowing some of the system
parameters to be time-varying is of obvious interest. Similarly,
letting prices be endogenous and/or dynamic variables that are
chosen by strategic service providers is another direction we
have started investigating.
Our work represents an initial step towards understanding
adoption dynamics of network technologies. Further work
building on this paper would likely provide additional insight.
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APPENDIX
The expressions for equilibria in R5 and R6, x
∗
R5
and x∗R6
of Tables III, IV and V are provided separately as eqs. (12)
and (13) respectively for better readability.
x
∗
1 R5
=
(p2 − p1) − β(1 − α1)
(q2 − q1) − [(1 − α2) + β(1 − α1)]
x
∗
2 R5
= 1 − x
∗
1 R5
=
(q2 − q1) − (p2 − p1) − (1 − α2)
(q2 − q1) − [(1 − α2) + β(1 − α1)]
(12)
x
∗
1 R6 =
p1q2 − p2q1 + βα1(p2 − q2) − β(p1 − q1)
(q1 − 1)(β − q2) + (q1 − α1β)(q1 − α2)
x
∗
2 R6 =
p2q1 − p1q1 − p2 + p1α2 + q1
2
− q1q2 + q2 − q1α2
(q1 − 1)(β − q2) + (q1 − α1β)(q1 − α2)
(13)
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TABLE III
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION TRAJECTORIES
x1(t) x2(t)
R1 x1(t0)e
−γ(t−t0) (x2(t0)−1)
x1(t0)
e−γt + 1
R2 c1e
−γ(t−t0) p2−q2
β−q2
+ c2e
−γ(1−β/q2)(t−t0) − c1 α2β e
−γt
c1 = x1(t0) c2 = [x2(t0) +
α2x1(t0)
β
− p2−q2
β−q2
]
R3 x1(t) = x1(t0)e
−γ(t−t0) x2(t) = x2(t0)e
−γ(t−t0)
R4 same as R1 same as R1
R5 x
∗
1R5
+ c2e
−γ(t−t0) + c1e
(−1+
(1−α2)+β(1−α1)
q2−q1
)γ(t−t0) x∗2R5 + c2
(1−α2)
β(1−α1)
e−γ(t−t0) − c1e
(−1+
(1−α2)+β(1−α1)
q2−q1
)γ(t−t0)
c1 =
β(1−α1)
1−α2+β(1−α1)
(x∗2R5 − x2(t0)) c2 = (
β(1−α1)
1−α2+β(1−α1)
)[x1(t0) + x2(t0) − 1]
− 1−α2
1−α2+β(1−α1)
(x∗1R5 − x1(t0))
R6 x
∗
1R6
+ c1K1e
A+
√
A2−4B
2
γ(t−t0) + c2K2e
A−
√
A2−4B
2
γ(t−t0) x∗2R6 + c1e
A+
√
A2−4B
2
γ(t−t0) + c2e
A−
√
A2−4B
2
γ(t−t0)
c1 =
(1−α2){x
∗
1R6
−x1(t0)−K2(x
∗
2R6
−x2(t0))}
(q2−q1)
√
A2−4B
c2 =
(1−α2){−(x
∗
1R6
−x1(t0))+K1(x
∗
2R6
−x2(t0))}
(q2−q1)
√
A2−4B
K1 =
α2+β(1−α1)−q2/q1−(q2−q1)
√
A2−4B
2(1−α2)
A = 1−α2+β(1−α1)
q2−q1
+ 1
q1
− 2
K2 =
α2+β(1−α1)−q2/q1+(q2−q1)
√
A2−4B
2(1−α2)
B = ( 1
q1
− 1)(β(1−α1)
q2−q1
− 1) + 1−α2
q2−q1
(βα1
q1
− 1)
R7 (x1(t0) − 1)e−γ(t−t0) + 1 x2(t0)e−γ(t−t0)
R8
p1−q1
1−q1
+ c1e
−γ(1− 1
q1
)(t−t0) − c2βα1e−γ(t−t0) c2e−γ(t−t0)
c1 = [x1(t0) + βα1x2(t0) − p1−q11−q1 ] c2 = x2(t0)
R9 x1(t) = x1(t0)e
−γ(t−t0) x2(t) = x2(t0)e
−γ(t−t0)
TABLE IV
CONDITIONS FOR STABLE, VALID EQUILIBRIA
Region Equilibria Stability Conditions Validity and Stability Conditions
R1 (0, 1) always locally stable p2 ≤ β, α1 ≤ p1β +
q1
q2
(1 − p2
β
)
R2 (0,
p2−q2
β−q2
) β < q2 β < p2 < q2
α1β(q2 − p2) ≤ β(q1 − p1) + p1q2 − p2q1
R4 (0, 1) always locally stable p1 < α1β,
p1
β
+ q1
q2
(1 − p2
β
) ≤ α1 ≤ 1 + p1−p2β
R5 (x
∗
1R5
, 1 − x∗1R5) q2 − q1 > 1 − α2 + β(1 − α1) p2 − p1 > β(1 − α1)
(See Eq. (12)) q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1) ≥ 1 − α2
q2 − q1 > β(1 − α1) + 1 − α2
α1β(α2 + q2 − q1 − p2) ≥ β − p2 − p1(β − α2 − (q2 − q1))
R6 (x
∗
1R6
, x∗2R6) See Table V 0 < x
∗
1R6
, 0 < x∗2R6 , 0 < x
∗
1R6
+ x∗2R6 < 1
(See Eq. (13))
R7 (1, 0) always locally stable p1 ≤ 1, α2 ≤ 1 + p2 − p1 − (q2 − q1)
R8 (
p1−q1
1−q1
, 0) 1 < q1 1 < p1 < q1
α2(q1 − p1) ≤ (1 − q1)(q2 − p2) + q1(q1 − p1)
TABLE V
STABILITY CONDITIONS FOR x∗R6
Case Conditions
A2 − 4B ≥ 0 A < 0 ⇔ β(1 − α1) − α2 < 2(q2 − q1) − q2q1
(Ref. Table III for exp. of A and B) B > 0 ⇔ (q1 − 1)(β − q2) + (q1 − α1β)(q1 − α2) < 0
A2 − 4B < 0 A < 0 ⇔ β(1 − α1) − α2 < 2(q2 − q1) − q2q1
